

Appendices

Table A1: Countries that participated in post-9/11 RDI (Open Society Foundations, 2013).

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, UK, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Table A2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent and Control Variables, after Coarsened Exact Matching.

Variable	N	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Revelation	133	0.338	0.475	0	1
Left Orientation	133	0.248	0.434	0	1
Regime Type	133	0.552	0.264	0.082	0.919
Election Proximity	133	0.226	0.420	0	1
Casualties (log)	133	0.194	0.741	0	4.344
Terrorism (log)	133	1.053	1.275	0	4.796
Economic Crisis	133	0.173	0.380	0	1
Term Limit	133	0.143	0.351	0	1

Table A3: Matched Sample, Balanced on all Control Variables Included in the Full Model.

Treatment Group	Control Group
Revelation of Participation in RDI	No Revelation of Participation in RDI
Afghanistan	Angola
Albania	Argentina
Algeria	Armenia
Australia	Bahrain
Austria	Belarus
Azerbaijan	Benin
Belgium	Bolivia
Canada	Botswana
Croatia	Brazil
Cyprus	Bulgaria
Czech Republic	Burkina Faso
Denmark	Burundi
Djibouti	Cambodia
Egypt	Cameroon
Ethiopia	Cape Verde
Finland	Central African Republic
Gambia	Chad
Georgia	Chile
Germany	Colombia
Greece	Comoros
Indonesia	Congo
Iran	Costa Rica
Ireland	Cuba
Italy	Democratic Republic of Congo
Jordan	Dominican Republic
Libya	East Timor
Lithuania	Ecuador
Macedonia	El Salvador
Malawi	Equatorial Guinea
Malaysia	Fiji
Morocco	France
Pakistan	Gabon
Poland	Ghana
Portugal	Guatemala
Romania	Guinea-Bissau
South Africa	Haiti
Sri Lanka	Honduras

Sweden	Hungary
Syria	Jamaica
Thailand	Japan
Turkey	Kazakhstan
United States of America	Kuwait
Uzbekistan	Kyrgyzstan
Yemen	Laos
Zimbabwe	Latvia
	Liberia
	Madagascar
	Mali
	Mexico
	Mongolia
	Myanmar
	Namibia
	Netherlands
	New Zealand
	Nicaragua
	Niger
	Nigeria
	North Korea
	Norway
	Oman
	Panama
	Papua New Guinea
	Paraguay
	Peru
	Philippines
	Russia
	Rwanda
	Senegal
	Sierra Leone
	Singapore
	Slovakia
	Slovenia
	South Korea
	Sudan
	Surinam
	Swaziland
	Switzerland

Taiwan
Tajikistan
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkmenistan
Uganda
Ukraine
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam

Table A4: Percent Balance Improvement of Difference in Means for Covariates Across the Treatment and Control Group.

Variable	Difference in Means		Change	% Change
	Pre-matched	Post-matched		
Left Orientation	0.03	0.006	Decrease	81.185
Regime Type Election	0.061	0.049	Decrease	19.361
Proximity	0.638	0.667	Increase	4.444
Casualties (log)	0.578	0.383	Decrease	33.779
Terrorism (log) Economic	0.75	0.701	Decrease	6.578
Crisis	0.035	0.026	Decrease	24.396
Term Limit	0.099	0.115	Increase	15.805

Table A5: Bayesian Logistic Regression, Electoral Defeat, Matched Sample, Democracies.

Variables	Model 1 Left Orientation Interaction	Model 2 Interaction Components and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model Left Orientation Interaction
Revelation	0.197 (0.513)	2.257* (1.159)	1.527 (1.180)
Left Orientation	-0.929 (0.619)	-0.277 (0.724)	-1.393 (0.968)
Revelation*Left Orientation	1.532* (0.857)		2.721* (1.400)
Election Proximity		-1.489 (1.162)	-1.781 (1.191)
Casualties (log)		0.252 (0.343)	0.164 (0.354)
Terrorism (log)		-0.531 (0.432)	-0.443 (0.437)
Economic Crisis		1.149 (1.032)	1.540 (1.071)
Term Limit		0.037 (1.033)	-0.022 (1.166)
Constant	0.049 (0.395)	-0.189 (0.686)	0.188 (0.712)
Observations	34	34	34
LR chi2	7.001	9.641	14.755
Prob>chi2	0.072	0.21	0.064
Pseudo R2	0.149	0.205	0.314
Log Likelihood	-20.008	-18.688	-16.131
Akaike Inf. Crit.	48.015	53.376	50.262

Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table A6: Bayesian Logistic Regression, Electoral Defeat, Matched Sample, Non-democracies.

Variables	Model 1 Left Orientation Interaction	Model 2 Interaction Components and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model Left Orientation Interaction
Revelation	-0.568 (0.390)	-0.068 (0.919)	-0.284 (0.947)
Left Orientation	-0.685 (0.473)	-0.111 (0.771)	-0.389 (0.842)
Revelation*Left Orientation	1.013 (0.815)		1.380 (1.349)
Election Proximity		-0.182 (1.047)	-0.156 (1.034)
Casualties (log)		-0.263 (1.420)	-0.237 (1.442)
Terrorism (log)		-0.228 (0.232)	-0.240 (0.233)
Economic Crisis		0.884 (0.645)	0.922 (0.654)
Term Limit		2.265*** (0.652)	2.258*** (0.655)
Constant	-0.708*** (0.180)	-1.953*** (0.492)	-1.916*** (0.491)
Observations	99	99	99
LR chi2	4.46	20.039	21.478
Prob>chi2	0.216	0.005	0.006
Pseudo R2	0.048	0.213	0.229
Log Likelihood	-44.710	-36.920	-36.201
Akaike Inf. Crit.	97.420	89.840	90.402

Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table A7: Probit Regression, Source of Leader Support Change, Matched Sample.

Variables	Model 1 Left Orientation Interaction	Model 2 Interaction Components and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model Left Orientation Interaction
Revelation	0.197 (0.314)	1.857*** (0.716)	1.818** (0.772)
Left Orientation	-0.155 (0.407)	0.440 (0.404)	-0.157 (0.544)
Revelation*Left Orientation	1.455** (0.668)		1.906** (0.970)
Regime Type		3.572*** (0.856)	3.922*** (0.964)
Election Proximity		-1.275* (0.724)	-1.633** (0.802)
Casualties (log)		0.041 (0.207)	-0.018 (0.234)
Terrorism (log)		-0.116 (0.147)	-0.119 (0.153)
Economic Crisis		-0.387 (0.443)	-0.285 (0.452)
Term Limit		1.161*** (0.417)	1.128*** (0.423)
Constant	-0.732*** (0.185)	-3.297*** (0.664)	-3.413*** (0.735)
Observations	108	108	108
LR chi2	11.007	46.732	50.926
Prob>chi2	0.012	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.085	0.361	0.393
Log Likelihood	-59.240	-41.378	-39.281
Akaike Inf. Crit.	126.480	100.755	98.561

Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table A8: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat, Excluding Countries that Cooperated and were Left of Center, Matched Sample (cont'd on next page).

Variables	Model 3 Full Model Excluding Algeria	Model 3 Full Model Excluding Canada	Model 3 Full Model Excluding Czech Republic	Model 3 Full Model Excluding Germany	Model 3 Full Model Excluding Libya	Model 3 Full Model Excluding Macedonia
Revelation	0.448 (0.491)	0.487 (0.489)	0.474 (0.489)	0.504 (0.491)	0.485 (0.493)	0.602 (0.501)
Left Orientation	-1.239** (0.534)	-1.255** (0.536)	-1.237** (0.535)	-1.242** (0.535)	-1.233** (0.534)	-1.248** (0.538)
Revelation*Left Orientation	1.851** (0.762)	1.717** (0.768)	1.725** (0.774)	1.703** (0.771)	1.874** (0.769)	1.495* (0.773)
Regime Type	3.290*** (0.795)	3.372*** (0.801)	3.275*** (0.795)	3.308*** (0.791)	3.261*** (0.796)	3.328*** (0.809)
Election Proximity	-0.466 (0.509)	-0.499 (0.504)	-0.514 (0.508)	-0.514 (0.506)	-0.520 (0.517)	-0.647 (0.522)
Casualties (log)	0.031 (0.182)	-0.030 (0.197)	0.048 (0.183)	-0.005 (0.186)	0.034 (0.182)	0.092 (0.187)
Terrorism (log)	-0.100 (0.127)	-0.095 (0.127)	-0.099 (0.127)	-0.112 (0.128)	-0.103 (0.127)	-0.152 (0.134)
Economic Crisis	0.724** (0.361)	0.716** (0.362)	0.730** (0.361)	0.717** (0.362)	0.725** (0.360)	0.742** (0.366)
Term Limit	0.987*** (0.375)	0.985*** (0.374)	0.996*** (0.374)	0.987*** (0.374)	0.989*** (0.374)	1.021*** (0.378)
Constant	-2.859*** (0.590)	-2.907*** (0.596)	-2.856*** (0.590)	-2.858*** (0.589)	-2.840*** (0.590)	-2.870*** (0.601)
Observations	132	132	132	132	132	132
LR chi2	54.757	53.466	53.235	53.5	54.901	55.697
Prob>chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.354	0.350	0.349	0.350	0.355	0.365
Log Likelihood	-49.967	-49.613	-49.728	-49.596	-49.895	-48.497
Akaike Inf. Crit.	119.935	119.225	119.457	119.192	119.790	116.994

Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table A9: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat, Excluding Countries that Cooperated and were Left of Center, Matched Sample (cont'd from previous page).

Variables	Model 3 Full Model Excluding Poland	Model 3 Full Model Excluding Portugal	Model 3 Full Model Excluding South Africa	Model 3 Full Model Excluding Sweden	Model 3 Full Model Excluding Uzbekistan
Revelation	0.399 (0.499)	0.459 (0.490)	0.750 (0.507)	0.425 (0.498)	0.457 (0.490)
Left Orientation	-1.274** (0.537)	-1.243** (0.534)	-1.259** (0.537)	-1.236** (0.534)	-1.239** (0.535)
Revelation*Left Orientation	2.151*** (0.796)	1.802** (0.763)	2.250*** (0.807)	1.758** (0.774)	1.836** (0.759)
Regime Type	3.463*** (0.807)	3.306*** (0.793)	3.388*** (0.801)	3.274*** (0.797)	3.291*** (0.801)
Election Proximity	-0.368 (0.516)	-0.486 (0.506)	-0.836 (0.539)	-0.431 (0.522)	-0.475 (0.508)
Casualties (log)	-0.013 (0.185)	0.034 (0.181)	0.018 (0.189)	0.041 (0.181)	0.034 (0.181)
Terrorism (log)	-0.104 (0.128)	-0.102 (0.127)	-0.153 (0.132)	-0.103 (0.127)	-0.104 (0.127)
Economic Crisis	0.716** (0.364)	0.725** (0.361)	0.735** (0.365)	0.724** (0.361)	0.724** (0.361)
Term Limit	0.974*** (0.378)	0.975** (0.380)	1.002*** (0.382)	0.988*** (0.374)	0.988*** (0.375)
Constant	-2.958*** (0.601)	-2.866*** (0.590)	-2.895*** (0.595)	-2.849*** (0.591)	-2.858*** (0.595)
Observations	132	132	132	132	132
LR chi2	57.562	52.723	58.662	52.942	54.683
Prob>chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.372	0.345	0.379	0.347	0.353
Log Likelihood	-48.565	-49.984	-48.015	-49.875	-50.004
Akaike Inf. Crit.	117.130	119.969	116.030	119.749	120.009

Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table A10: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat, Right of Center Governments, Matched Sample.

Variables	Model 1 Left Orientation Interaction	Model 2 Interaction Components and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model Left Orientation Interaction
Revelation	0.210 (0.292)	0.766 (0.469)	0.896* (0.513)
Right Orientation	1.112*** (0.378)	0.561* (0.327)	0.710* (0.417)
Revelation*Right Orientation	-0.042 (0.590)		-0.385 (0.644)
Regime Type		2.702*** (0.718)	2.740*** (0.725)
Election Proximity		-0.388 (0.504)	-0.407 (0.496)
Casualties (log)		0.029 (0.183)	0.038 (0.182)
Terrorism (log)		-0.121 (0.127)	-0.132 (0.129)
Economic Crisis		0.584* (0.352)	0.581* (0.353)
Term Limit		0.958*** (0.364)	0.967*** (0.367)
Constant	-0.932*** (0.171)	-2.796*** (0.553)	-2.858*** (0.568)
Observations	133	133	133
LR chi2	15.897	50.534	50.885
Prob>chi2	0.001	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.102	0.325	0.328
Log Likelihood	-69.714	-52.396	-52.221
Akaike Inf. Crit.	147.429	122.792	124.441

Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table A11: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat, Excluding Countries with an Islamic Majority Population that Cooperated and were Left of Center, Matched Sample.

Variables	Model 1 Left Orientation Interaction	Model 2 Interaction Components and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model Left Orientation Interaction
Revelation	-0.045 (0.285)	0.813* (0.467)	0.460 (0.496)
Left Orientation	-0.776* (0.409)	-0.441 (0.367)	-1.223** (0.533)
Revelation*Left Orientation	1.811*** (0.639)		1.825** (0.785)
Regime Type		3.100*** (0.760)	3.212*** (0.798)
Election Proximity		-0.423 (0.505)	-0.466 (0.521)
Casualties (log)		0.198 (0.209)	0.119 (0.212)
Terrorism (log)		-0.115 (0.127)	-0.089 (0.127)
Economic Crisis		0.596* (0.350)	0.719** (0.359)
Term Limit		0.995*** (0.363)	0.991*** (0.373)
Constant	-0.560*** (0.163)	-2.856*** (0.566)	-2.826*** (0.589)
Observations	130	130	130
LR chi2	10.64	48.833	54.834
Prob>chi2	0.014	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.069	0.318	0.357
Log Likelihood	-71.383	-52.287	-49.286
Akaike Inf. Crit.	150.766	122.573	118.573

Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses. Countries removed from the sample include Algeria, Libya and the U.S..

Table A12: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat, Excluding Countries with above Average Number of U.S. Military Bases that Cooperated and were Left of Center, Matched Sample.

Variables	Model 1 Left Orientation Interaction	Model 2 Interaction Components and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model Left Orientation Interaction
Revelation	-0.045 (0.285)	0.808* (0.462)	0.486 (0.492)
Left Orientation	-0.776* (0.409)	-0.541 (0.376)	-1.236** (0.533)
Revelation*Left Orientation	1.240** (0.630)		1.623** (0.782)
Regime Type		3.134*** (0.757)	3.281*** (0.790)
Election Proximity		-0.475 (0.503)	-0.481 (0.510)
Casualties (log)		0.113 (0.215)	0.076 (0.215)
Terrorism (log)		-0.121 (0.128)	-0.099 (0.128)
Economic Crisis		0.600* (0.349)	0.714** (0.360)
Term Limit		0.947** (0.372)	0.973** (0.379)
Constant	-0.560*** (0.163)	-2.834*** (0.565)	-2.853*** (0.588)
Observations	130	130	130
LR chi2	5.738	46.564	51.209
Prob>chi2	0.125	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.038	0.312	0.343
Log Likelihood	-71.837	-51.424	-49.101
Akaike Inf. Crit.	151.674	120.848	118.202

Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses. Countries removed from the sample include Portugal, Germany and the U.S..

Table A13: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat, Excluding Countries with above Average US Trade%GDPPC that Cooperated and were Left of Center, Matched Sample.

Variables	Model 1 Left Orientation Interaction	Model 2 Interaction Components and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model Left Orientation Interaction
Revelation	-0.045 (0.285)	1.024** (0.486)	0.760 (0.508)
Left Orientation	-0.776* (0.409)	-0.539 (0.393)	-1.256** (0.537)
Revelation*Left Orientation	1.560** (0.670)		1.974** (0.864)
Regime Type		3.285*** (0.780)	3.382*** (0.805)
Election Proximity		-0.678 (0.522)	-0.807 (0.542)
Casualties (log)		-0.091 (0.255)	-0.043 (0.258)
Terrorism (log)		-0.144 (0.131)	-0.137 (0.132)
Economic Crisis		0.579* (0.352)	0.711* (0.363)
Term Limit		0.983*** (0.364)	0.989*** (0.378)
Constant	-0.560*** (0.163)	-2.908*** (0.575)	-2.886*** (0.594)
Observations	128	128	128
LR chi2	7.318	48.39	54.171
Prob>chi2	0.062	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R2	0.049	0.327	0.366
Log Likelihood	-70.435	-49.899	-47.008
Akaike Inf. Crit.	148.869	117.798	114.017

Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses. Countries removed from the sample include Canada, Germany, South Africa, Algeria and the U.S..

Table A14: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat, Election Circa 1996, Matched Sample.

Variables	Model 1 Left Orientation Interaction	Model 2 Interaction Components and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model Left Orientation Interaction
Revelation	-0.390 (0.291)	-0.433 (0.431)	-0.638 (0.463)
Left Orientation	-0.174 (0.327)	0.019 (0.275)	-0.240 (0.341)
Revelation*Left Orientation	0.880 (0.557)		0.793 (0.581)
Regime Type		1.319*** (0.506)	1.284** (0.514)
Election Proximity		0.300 (0.467)	0.312 (0.476)
Casualties (log)		-0.011 (0.170)	-0.029 (0.173)
Terrorism (log)		-0.051 (0.105)	-0.054 (0.105)
Economic Crisis		-0.040 (0.317)	-0.001 (0.319)
Term Limit		-0.156 (0.343)	-0.186 (0.345)
Constant	-0.431*** (0.160)	-1.133*** (0.344)	-1.049*** (0.353)
Observations	133	133	133
LR chi2	3.124	9.855	11.694
Prob>chi2	0.373	0.275	0.231
Pseudo R2	0.019	0.061	0.072
Log Likelihood	-79.767	-76.402	-75.483
Akaike Inf. Crit.	167.535	170.804	170.965


Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Table A15: Probit Regression, Electoral Defeat, Election Before the Revelation, Matched Sample.

Variables	Model 1 Left Orientation Interaction	Model 2 Interaction Components and Control Variables	Model 3 Full Model Left Orientation Interaction
Revelation	0.598** (0.294)	-0.216 (0.472)	-0.053 (0.497)
Left Orientation	-0.114 (0.366)	-0.656* (0.359)	-0.247 (0.413)
Revelation*Left Orientation	-0.907 (0.715)		-1.298* (0.785)
Regime Type		2.231*** (0.665)	2.212*** (0.650)
Election Proximity		0.705 (0.506)	0.835 (0.532)
Casualties (log)		0.034 (0.204)	0.073 (0.211)
Terrorism (log)		0.124 (0.117)	0.124 (0.119)
Economic Crisis		0.321 (0.339)	0.269 (0.343)
Term Limit		-0.128 (0.375)	-0.071 (0.380)
Constant	-0.728*** (0.178)	-2.097*** (0.466)	-2.171*** (0.461)
Observations	117	117	117
LR chi2	6.162	21.957	24.973
Prob>chi2	0.104	0.005	0.003
Pseudo R2	0.045	0.160	0.182
Log Likelihood	-65.564	-57.667	-56.159
Akaike Inf. Crit.	139.129	133.333	132.318


Significant codes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 with Standard Errors in parentheses.

Figure A1: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals, Source of Leader Support Change.




Predicted probabilities of electoral defeat based on the unique combinations of the revelation variable and the party orientation variable from model 3. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A2: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals, Electoral Defeat, Excluding Countries that Cooperated and were Left of Center, Matched Sample (cont'd on next page).




Predicted probabilities of electoral defeat based on the unique combinations of the revelation variable and the party orientation variable from model 3. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A3: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals, Electoral Defeat, Excluding Countries that Cooperated and were Left of Center, Matched Sample (cont'd from previous page).



Predicted probabilities of electoral defeat based on the unique combinations of the revelation variable and the party orientation variable from model 3. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A4: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals, Electoral Defeat, Excluding Countries with an Islamic Majority Population that Cooperated and were Left of Center.




Predicted probabilities of electoral defeat based on the unique combinations of the revelation variable and the party orientation variable. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A5: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals, Electoral Defeat, Excluding Countries with above Average Number of U.S. Military Bases that Cooperated and were Left of Center.



Predicted probabilities of electoral defeat based on the unique combinations of the revelation variable and the party orientation variable from model 3. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure A6: Predicted Probabilities with 95% Confidence Intervals, Electoral Defeat, Excluding Countries with above Average US Trade%GDPPC that Cooperated and were Left of Center.



Predicted probabilities of electoral defeat based on the unique combinations of the revelation variable and the party orientation variable from model 3. The error bars represent the lower and upper bounds of the estimation with 95% confidence intervals.